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1 Introduction
Bu¤ering unforeseen shocks and forecasting the evolution of the economy are key mon-
etary policy issues. While the former is a classical theme, the relevance of the latter
became apparent with the advent of ination targeting. This new monetary regime high-
lighted how long and variable lags in the transmission of the policy action, along with
the exposure to exogenous disturbances, require an operating procedure based on distri-
bution forecast targeting. Central bank prociency at forecasting also matters in shaping
the expectations of the private sector, thus enhancing monetary policy e¤ectiveness. This
is the so called expectations channel. Its relevance in the monetary policy transmission
mechanism is well captured by the consolidated view that successful monetary policy is,
mainly, the management of the market expectations, as Woodford (2001) initially put
it1. On the operational side, another key monetary policy issue is the choice of the price
index to target (Bernanke et al. 1999). Intuitively, a price index should measure the cost
of living. Yet, economists have long recognized that such a price index may not meet the
purposes of conducting monetary policy (Mankiew and Reis 2003).
Starting from these considerations, this paper relates the accuracy of the central bank
distribution forecasts and the expected perturbing impact of unforeseen shocks to the
choice of the ination index to stabilize in a small open-economy. The focus of the analysis
is on the choice between the domestic price index and the consumer price (CPI) index.
These indexes di¤er in that the former refers to the goods produced domestically while
the latter to the consumption goods produced domestically and imported. This disparity
implies a di¤erent sensitivity of the indexes to exchange rate movements and shocks
stemming from the rest of the world. Indeed, the CPI exhibits a direct sensitivity through
the price of foreign goods imported for consumption. In contrast, the sensitivity of the
domestic price index is mediated by foreign goods used as inputs to produce domestic
goods. This di¤erent sensitivity of the two indexes gets reected in the extent and
timing of the central bank response to exchange rate movements and foreign shocks, and
motivates the interest to study how the indexes perform in terms of forecastsaccuracy
and expected economic stability.
Aiming to portray a real-world monetary policy scenario, the current analysis en-
1Theoretically, the New-Keynesian model embedding agents forward looking behavior shows the
major role played by the expectations channel. In practice, the rising trend over the last decade in
central bankstransparency, in particular the publication of the internal distribution forecasts explained
by Monetary Policy Reports, signals the importance attributed to this channel (see, among others,
Blinder et al. 2001, Fracasso, Genberg and Wyplosz 2003, Geraats 2002, 2005).
2
compasses both additive and multiplicative uncertainty. The modeling strategy for the
various sources of uncertainty follows the Svensson and Williams (2007) approach based
on Markov jump-linear-quadratic systems. In this framework, I consider the distribution
forecasts of the macrovariables determined by the optimal monetary policy response to
several exogenous shocks in the presence of model uncertainty. It is worthy of note that
forecasting the evolution of the economy requires specifying correct economic dynamics.
Thus, this paper uses a monetary policy transmission mechanism with realistic lags and
inertia in the private sector behavior.
The main contribution of the analysis lies in showing that the stabilization of CPI
ination tends to be inversely related to both the accuracy of the distribution forecasts
of the other macrovariables and the expected perturbing impact of several shocks. Thus,
the current work unveils domestic ination targeting (henceforth DIT) as the policy that
performs best at forecasting accuracy and shocks bu¤ering for most of the macrovariables.
The intuition is based on the combined action of two factors: the level of policy activism
corresponding to the choice of the ination index to stabilize, and the consideration of
model uncertainty on the part of the central bank. Since under CPI ination targeting
(henceforth CPI IT) there is more policy activism than under DIT, when the central
bank decides the optimal policy and takes into account model uncertainty a more active
policy results in more volatility and shock sensitivity for most of the macrovariables.
This nding relates to three strands of the monetary policy literature: i. central bank
transparency and the publication of its distribution forecasts; ii. optimal monetary policy
with model uncertainty and exogenous shocks; and iii. the choice of the ination measure
to target.
Regarding central bank transparency, the possibility to increase the overall forecasting
accuracy through the choice of the ination index, in particular for the interest rate,
can foster the credibility of the central bank. More credibility, in turn, enhances the
ability of the distribution forecasts to shape the expectations of the private sector. This
suggests that under DIT there are larger benets associated with the publication of the
distribution forecasts for the interest rate and the related distribution forecasts for the
other macrovariables.
The second link with the literature is about a new aspect of the relation between
optimal monetary policy and model uncertainty. Starting with the Brainards (2007)
seminal contribution, some authors among which Söderström (2002) have investigated
how the optimal monetary policy response to the state variables of the economy attenuates
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or increases in the presence of model uncertainty. It has not been investigated, however,
if and to what extent accounting for the presence of model uncertainty matter in the
choice of the ination index to stabilize. In this respect, the current paper contributes to
the literature by showing that with model uncertainty the choice of the ination measure
signicantly a¤ects the expected forecast accuracy and economic stability.
Finally, the paper relates to the open question in monetary policy of which ination
measure to target. All over the world, ination targeting central banks tend to choose the
CPI as the index to target. Yet this is more and more a contentious choice as argued in an
increasing number of contributions from central banks practice and academic literature.
Clearly, the CPI bears the advantage of being an index the private sector is more sensitive
to and familiar with. Thus, targeting CPI ination favours central bank accountability.
This statistic, however, has various downsides. One problem pointed at by Batini, Levine
and Pearlman (2005) is that policy rules which include the CPI may lead to economic
indeterminacy. A second problem is that the CPI index is quite exposed to shocks that
turn out to be temporary. In this case the central bank tends not to react because
interventions in the presence of lags between the instrument and the goal can increase,
rather than reduce, the variability of CPI2.
Along with these shortcomings, CPI IT does not seem to o¤er a clear advantage
in terms of welfare. Indeed, adopting a welfare perspective, various scholars reached
contrasting conclusions on the ination measure to target. Aoki (2001) and Benigno
(2004) examine a model with two sectors that di¤er in their degree of price stickiness
and show that monetary policy should target ination in the sticky-price sector. In an
open economy this prescription suggests one should target domestic ination as it tends
to be stickier than CPI ination. Mankiew and Reis (2003) show that in a two-sector
economy the price index maximising economic stability is positively related to the sectoral
price sensitivity to the business cycle and the sectoral degree of price stickiness, while
it is negatively related to the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks and to the weight of the
sectoral price in the CPI . As a result, a stability price index is substantially di¤erent
from the CPI. Gali and Monacelli (2005) argue that DIT dominates both CPI IT and an
2Heikensten (1999) and Rosemberg (2004) discuss how this made it di¢ cult for the Riksbank to
explain its behavior to the private sector, sometimes requiring to motivate policy decisions using other
price indexes less exposed to temporary shocks. Rosemberg also notes that at some occasions the actual
monetary policy has de facto been based on a di¤erent index. Similarly, Macklem (2001) maintains that
while the Bank of Canadas ination-control target is specied in terms of CPI ination, operationally,
the Bank uses a measure of trend or "core" ination as short term guide for its monetary policy actions.
Further along the line, Young Ha (2002) and Guender (2003) introduced a case for choosing domestic
ination as it is less exposed to temporary shocks.
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exchange-rate peg. They base their argument on the "excess smoothness" induced in the
exchange rate by CPI targeting or an exchange rate peg which prevents relative prices
from adjusting su¢ ciently fast. Di¤erent results are obtained by Kirsanova, Leith and
Wren-Lewis (2006) and De Paoli (2004) who nd that central bank preferences should
include the terms of trade gap together with the output gap and domestic price ination.
These diverse ndings can be explained by di¤erent assumptions at the basis of the
private sector behavior. From a central bank operational perspective, however, it is dif-
cult to assess the most appropriate assumptions to model the behavior of the private
sector. This is due to considerable uncertainty on the true model of the economy. Fur-
thermore, the relationship between optimal monetary policy for a small open-economy
and welfare in the presence of realistic transmission lags is still largely unexplored. It
is arguably premature to directly use welfare models for policy prescriptions. Moving
from these remarks, the current work adopts an operational perspective that abstracts
from welfare considerations. It explores how alternative price indexes perform in terms
of distribution forecast accuracy and amplitude of business cycle uctuations when the
central bank considers model uncertainty in the optimal policy design.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 presents and describes the results using impulse distribution forecasts under alterna-
tive central bank ination indexes. Section 4 discusses the papers ndings in relation to
transparency in monetary policy and the publication of future policy intentions. Con-
clusions are in section 5. Finally, the Appendix describes the state-space form of the
model.
2 The model
The model consists of a linear-quadratic setup for optimal monetary policy nested into
a non-certainty equivalence framework. As to the agentsbehavior, preferences and con-
straints are modeled to have a realistic transmission mechanism of the monetary policy.
This is a necessary condition to have proper dynamics and, consequently, realistic fore-
casts. Non-certainty equivalence, the second component of the framework, is a necessary
condition to study how multiplicative uncertainty a¤ects the optimal monetary policy.
Since the model has also forward looking variables, non-certainty equivalence is modeled
by using the general approach developed by Svensson and Williams (2007).
The characterization of the behavior of the private sector follows Flamini (2007) and
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can be summarized in ve main assumptions3. First, the economy is populated by four
optimizing agents: a representative rm both for the sector that produces and retails
domestic goods and for the sector that imports and retails foreign goods (henceforth the
domestic and the import sector respectively), a representative household and a central
bank. Second, the domestic and import sectors are connected. Indeed, the domestic
one employs import goods as an intermediate input and the import sector, in turn,
may employ domestic goods to retail foreign goods creating incomplete pass-through.
Third, both sectors are characterized by monopolistic competition and sticky prices. The
latter assumption with respect to the import sector determines delayed pass-through.
Fourth, realistic persistence in the behavior of the rms and households is captured,
respectively, by ination indexation and habit formation in consumption. Fifth, in line
with the empirical evidence observed by central banks, a two-period lag for monetary
policy to a¤ect domestic ination and a one-period lag to a¤ect the aggregate demand
are introduced, respectively, by predetermined pricing and consumption decisions.
These ingredients map into aggregate demands and supplies for the two sectors and
an uncovered interest parity relation. Finally, the model is closed with an intertemporal
loss function modelling the preferences of the central bank and exogenous relations to
capture the behavior of the rest of the world.
2.1 The household
The economy is made up of a continuum of consumers/producers indexed by j 2 [0; 1]
sharing the same preferences and living forever. Intertemporal utility for the representa-
tive household is given by
Et
1X
=0
U
 
Ct+ ; Ct+ 1

; (1)
where  is the intertemporal discount factor, Ct is total consumption of household j;
and Ct is the total aggregate consumption. Preferences over total consumption feature
habit formation which is modeled as in Abel (1990) by the following instantaneous utility
function
3A terse description of the private sector behaviour is reported here as it allows a clear presentation
of the model uncertainty considered by the central bank and modeled in sections 2.5-2.6. For details on
the derivation of the structural relations referring to the private sector see Flamini (2007).
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U
 
Ct+ ; Ct+ 1

=
 
Ct+= C

t+ 1
1  1

1  1

; (2)
where   0 captures habit persistence and  > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Total consumption, Ct; is a Cobb-Douglas function of domestic good con-
sumption, Cdt ; and import good consumption, C
i
t ;
Ct  Cd(1 w)t C
iw
t ; (3)
where w determines the steady state share of imported goods in total consumption and
Cdt , C
i
t are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of continuum of di¤erentiated domestic goods and
import goods (henceforth indexed with d and i respectively),
Cht =
Z  
Cht (j)
1  1
# dj
 1
1 #
; h = d; i;
where # > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two di¤erentiated goods and,
for the sake of simplicity, is the same in both sectors4. The ow budget constraint for
consumer j in any period t is given by
Bt
1 + It
+
Bt
1 + It
St + P
c
t Ct = Bt 1 +B

t 1St +D
d
t +D
i
t;
where B and B are two international bonds issued on a discount basis and denominated
in domestic and foreign currency with interest rates It and It respectively, St is the
nominal exchange rate, expressed as home currency per unit of foreign currency, Ddt and
Dit are the dividends distributed by the domestic and the import sector and, nally, P
c
is the overall Dixit-Stiglitz price index for the minimum cost of a unit of Ct and is given
by
P ct =
P i
w
t P
d(1 w)
t
ww (1  w)(1 w)
; (4)
with P d; P i denoting, respectively, the Dixit-Stiglitz price index for goods produced in
the domestic and import sector.
Assuming a no-Ponzi schemes condition, utility maximization subject to the budget
constraint and the limit on borrowing gives the Euler equation and the Uncovered Interest
Parity, respectively
4Following Corsetti and Pesenti (2004), the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic
and import goods is set equal to one. This assumption ensures the stationarity of the model.
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ct = ct 1 + (1  ) ct+1jt   (1  )
 
it   ct+1jt

;    (1  )
1 +  (1  ) < 1; (5)
it   it = st+1jt   st + t; (6)
where for any variable x; the expression xt+ jt stands for the rational expectation of
that variable in period t +  conditional on the information available in period t and,
by means of a log-linearization, the variables ct, ct , it, i

t ,
 
st+1jt   st

and t are log-
deviations from their respective constant steady state values; nally, ct denotes total
aggregate consumption, obtained considering that in equilibrium total consumption for
agent j is equal to total aggregate consumption, i.e. Ct = Ct; ct denotes CPI ination
(measured as the log deviation of gross CPI ination from the constant CPI ination
target), and t is a risk premium shock added to capture nancial market volatility and
it is modeled with a stationary univariate AR(1) process
t+1 = t + 

t+1:
2.1.1 Domestic consumption of goods produced in the domestic sector
Preferences captured by equation (3) imply that the (log deviation of the) domestic
demand for goods produced in the domestic sector, cdt ; is given by
cdt = ct  
 
pdt   pct

;
which, considering the (log-linearized version of the) price index equation (4), can be
rewritten as
cdt = ct + wqt; (7)
where qt  pit   pdt is the (log-deviation of the) terms of trade.
Then, solving equation (5) for ct and combining it with equation (7) I obtain
cdt =   (1  F1L) 1 t    (1  F1L) 1wqt + wqt; (8)
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where F1 < 1 is the smaller root of the characteristic polynomial of equation (5) and
t 
1X
=0
 
it+ jt   dt++1jt

(9)
can be interpreted as the long real interest rate.
2.1.2 Aggregate demand for goods produced in the domestic sector
Total aggregate demand for the good produced in the domestic sector is
bY dt = Cdt + Y d;dt + Y d;it + Cdt ; (10)
where Y d;dt ; Y
d;i
t and C
d
t denote the quantity of the (composite) domestic good which is
used as an input in the domestic sector, as an input in the import sector and which is
demanded by the foreign sector, respectively.
Both sectors are assumed to share the same Leontief technology and each one features
a continuum of unit mass of rms, indexed by j; that produce di¤erentiated goods Y dt (j)
and Y it (j) in the domestic and import sector respectively. Furthermore, the two sectors
di¤er for the input used: the domestic sector uses a composite input consisting of the
domestic (composite) good itself and the (composite) import good provided by the import
sector; the import sector uses a composite input consisting of the foreign good Y t and
the domestic (composite good). Thus the technologies in the domestic and import sector
are given respectively by
Y dt (j) = f
"
Adt min
(
Y d;dt
1  ;
Y i;dt

)#
; Y it (j) = f
"
Aitmin
(
Y t
1  i ;
Y d;it
i
)#
; ; i 2 [0; 1];
(11)
where f is an increasing, concave, isoelastic function, At is an exogenous (sector specic)
economy-wide productivity parameter, (1  ) and  denote, respectively, the shares of
the domestic good and import good in the composite input required to produce the dif-
ferentiated domestic good j; and (1  i) and i denote, respectively, the shares of the
foreign good and domestic good in the composite input required to provide the di¤eren-
tiated import good j:
Thus the quantities of the (composite) domestic good used as an input in the domestic
9
and import sector are
Y d;dt =
1
Adt
(1  ) f 1
bY dt  ; Y d;it = 1Aitif 1
bY it  ; (12)
where bY it denotes the demand of the import good. Finally, log-linearizing equation (10)
around the steady state values yields
bydt = 1  i cdt + 2  i byit + 3  i cdt ; (13)
where 01 (
i) ; 03 (
i) < 0 and 02 (
i) > 0.
Next, as in Svensson (2000), cdt is exogenous and given by
cdt = 

yy

t + 
wqt; (14)
where ct denotes (log) foreign real consumption, 
 and w denote, respectively, the
foreign atemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and the
share of domestic goods in foreign consumption. Furthermore, the output-gap in the
domestic sector ydt is dened as
ydt  bydt   yd;nt ;
where yd;nt denotes the log deviation of the natural output in the domestic sector from its
steady state value, and in both sectors the log-deviation of the natural output from its
steady state value is exogenous, stochastic and follows
yh;nt+1 = 
h;n
y y
h;n
t + 
h;n
t+1; 0  h;ny < 1; h = d; i; (15)
where h;nt+1 is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean shock to the natural output level (a
productivity shock). Finally, in line with the central banksview of the approximate one-
period lag necessary to a¤ect aggregate demand, I assume that consumption decisions
are predetermined one period in advance. Accordingly, repeating the same derivation
with preferences maximized on the basis of one period ahead information results in the
aggregate demand in the domestic sector. This relation, expressed in terms of the output-
gap, is given by
ydt+1 = yy
d
t   t+1jt + qqt+1jt   q 1qt + yyt + ynyd;nt + dt+1   d;nt+1; (16)
where dt+1 is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean demand shock. In (16) all the coe¢ cients
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are positive and functions of the structural parameters of the model.
2.1.3 Aggregate demand of goods produced in the import sector
Aggregate demand for import goods is given by
bY it = Cit + Y i;dt (17)
where Y i;dt denotes the amount of the import good used as an input in the domestic
sector. Log-linearizing (17) around the steady state results in
byit = (1  e) cit + ebydt : (18)
Finally, the same assumptions used to derive the aggregate demand for the domestic
sector goods yield
yit+1 = yy
i
t   it+1jt   iqqt+1jt + iq 1qt + iyyt + iynyi;nt + it+1   i;nt+1; (19)
where all the coe¢ cients are positive and depend on the structural parameters of the
model, and it+1 is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean demand shock.
2.2 Firms
In both sectors, the aggregate supply is derived according to the Calvo (1983) staggered
price model while ination inertia is introduced as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005) and also by the presence of the terms of trade as shown in Benigno (2004). Beyond
the use of di¤erent inputs, the two sectors di¤er in the rms decision timing.
2.2.1 Domestic sector
In the domestic sector, the representative consumer/producer j produces the variety
j of the domestic good, Y dt (j) ; with a composite input whose price is Wt. Since all
the varieties use the same technology, there is a unique input requirement function for
all j given by 1
Adt
f 1

Y dt (j)

and the variable cost of producing the quantity Y dt (j)
is Wt 1Adt
f 1

Y dt (j)

: Furthermore, since there is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of domestic
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goods, the demand for variety j is
Y dt (j) =
bY dt P dt (j)P dt
 #
;
where P dt (j) is the nominal price for variety j and # is the elasticity of substitution
between di¤erent varieties. As shown in equation (11), the composite input is a convex
combination of both aggregates of domestic and import goods. Thus the price of the
input is given by Wt  (1  )P dt + P it :
Then, I assume (i) that the consumer/producer chooses in any period the new price
with probability (1  ) or keeps the previous period price indexed to past ination with
probability ; and (ii) that the price at period t+ 2 is chosen 2 periods in advance. The
latter assumption is motivated by the fact that domestic sector rms take both production
and retailing decisions. The implication is that monetary policy needs a two-period lag
to a¤ect domestic ination. This is in line with the central banks experience of an
approximate two-period lag for monetary policy to have the highest impact on ination.
It follows that the decision problem for rm j at time t is
maxeP dt+2 Et
1X
=0
edt++2
8>><>>:
eP dt+2 P dt++1P dt+1 
P dt+2+
bY dt++2
264 eP dt+2

P dt++1
P dt+1

P dt+2+
375
 #
(20)
 Wt++2
P dt++2
f 1
264bY dt++2
0@ eP dt+2Pdt++1Pdt+1 
P dt+2+
1A #
375
Adt++2
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
;
where edt ; eP dt+2 and denote, respectively, the marginal utility of domestic goods, the new
price chosen in period t for period t + 2 and the degree of indexation to the previous
period ination rate5. Following Svensson (2000), I set  = 1 to ensure the natural-rate
hypothesis. Finally, assuming that the purchasing power parity holds in the long run,
5Recalling that consumption decisions are predetermined one period in advance, the marginal utility
of domestic goods edt is obtained by the following rst-order condition with respect to Cdt+1
EtUd
 
Cdt+1; C
i
t+1

= Et

t+1P
d
t+1
  Etedt+1;
where t is the marginal utility of nominal income in period t:
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the log-linearized version of the Phillips curve for the domestic sector turns out to be
dt+2 =
1
1 + 
"
dt+1 + 
d
t+3jt +
(1  )2
 (1 + !#)
 
!ydt+2jt + qt+2jt
#
+ "t+2 (21)
= 
d
t+1 + (1  )dt+3jt + dyydt+2jt + dqqt+2jt + "t+2; (22)
where ! in (21) is the output elasticity of the marginal input requirement function and
"t+2 is a zero-mean i.i.d. cost-push shock. In (22) all the implicitly dened coe¢ cients
are positive.
2.2.2 Import sector
Similar to the domestic sector, variety j of the import goods, Y it (j), is produced by the
representative consumer/producer j with a composite input whose price is Ft. Since the
input requirement function is 1
Ait
f 1 [Y it (j)] ; the variable cost of producing the quan-
tity Y it (j) is Ft
1
Ait
f 1 [Y it (j)]. Furthermore, considering that the input is a convex
combination of the aggregate of domestic goods and of the foreign good, with price
P t St; where P

t is the price in foreign currency of the foreign good, it follows that
Ft  iP dt + (1  i)P t St.
Now relaxing the assumption that pricing decisions are predetermined and keeping
all the remaining assumptions used to derive the Phillips curve in the domestic sector
results in
it =
1
1 + 
"
it 1 + 
i
t+1jt +
(1  i)2
i (1 + !#)
 
!yit + q
i
t
#
(23)
= 
i
t 1 + (1  )it+1jt + iyyit + iqqit; (24)
where i has the same meaning as its analogous variable in the domestic sector, qit denotes
(the log deviation of) the price of the composite input in the import sector expressed in
terms of the import goods price, pit; and is dened as
qit 
 
1  i (st + pt ) + ipdt   pit; (25)
where pt is the (log) foreign price level. Relaxing the assumption of predetermined pricing
decisions is motivated by the fact that the import sector only acts as a retailer for the
foreign goods and, in practice, retailers do not set their price before they take e¤ect as
much as producers do. It is worthy of note that i and i determine, respectively, the
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speed and the degree of completeness of the pass-through6.
2.3 CPI ination and the uncovered interest parity
CPI-ination, ct ; is given by
ct = (1  w)dt + wit; (26)
where w is the steady state share of imported goods in total consumption and determines
the degree of openness of the economy. In order to eliminate the non-stationary nominal
exchange rate, it is convenient to express the Uncovered Interest Parity in terms of qit
obtaining
qit+1jt   qit =
 
1  i rt    1  i  it   t+1jt   it+1jt   dt+1jt   1  i t; (27)
where rt is the short term real interest rate dened as rt  it   dt+1jt:
2.4 The public sector and the rest of the world
The behavior of the central bank consists of minimizing the following loss function:
Et
1X
=0


cc2t+ + 
dd2t+ + y
d2
t+ +  (it+   it+ 1)2

; (28)
where c; d;  and  are weights that express the preferences of the central bank for
CPI and domestic ination targets, the output stabilization target, and the instrument
smoothing target, respectively.
The rest of the world is exogenous and described by stationary univariate AR(1)
processes for foreign ination and income
t+1 = 



t + "

t+1; (29)
yt+1 = 

yy

t + 

t+1; (30)
where the coe¢ cients are non-negative and less than unity, and the shocks are white
noises. Finally, the foreign sector monetary policy is set according to the following Taylor
6About the relevance of these factors in the determination of low exchange rate pass-through see
Devereux and Yetman (2008), Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003) and Corsetti and Dedola (2005).
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rule
it = f



t + f

y y

t + 

t ; (31)
where the coe¢ cients are positive, and it is a white noise.
2.5 Optimal monetary policy with model uncertainty
I now assume that the central bank is uncertain on the persistence in the behaviors of
rms and households, the degree of price stickiness and the speed and completeness of
the pass-through. This assumption is modeled assuming that the central bank has a prior
belief on the probability distribution of the deep parameters underlying these phenomena.
A similar approach is followed by Kimura and Kurozumi (2007) who show in a forward-
looking model how deep parameter uncertainty can lead to a more aggressive optimal
monetary policy in a closed economy.
The uncertainty on the persistence in the household behavior is modeled by assuming
uncertainty over habit formation in consumption preferences, captured by the parameter
 in equation (2). This choice is useful to model central bank uncertainty on the degree
of backward and forward looking household behavior. This can be seen in equation (5)
where the parameter  is now uncertain due to : It turns out that the uncertainty on
this basic feature of the household behavior impacts on many coe¢ cients in the aggregate
demands. Indeed, considering equations (16) and (19) uncertain habit formation implies
that, for any period t; not only the coe¢ cient of the previous period output gap becomes
uncertain, i.e. y, but also several other coe¢ cients become uncertain. Specically, these
are the coe¢ cients for the previous period terms of trade, q 1 and 
i
q 1 ; foreign output
y and iy ; and the natural output in the domestic sector and import sectors, yn and
iyn.
The remaining sources of multiplicative uncertainty of the model are located in the
supply side. Here the setup features sticky prices à la Calvo (1983) and indexation to
the previous period ination rate for the rms that cannot optimally update the price in
the current period. In this framework, by assuming that the central bank is uncertain on
the rmsdegree of backward-looking indexation, ; in equation (20), the central bank
turns out to be uncertain on the degree of inertia and forward-looking behavior in the
ination process. This assumption is motivated by a fair amount of disagreement in
empirical evidence and theoretical works7. Importantly, uncertain inertia in the rms
behavior, turns out to a¤ect all the coe¢ cients of the aggregate supplies and adds to
7See Kimura and Kurozumi (2007) as to the contrasting results disseminated in the literature.
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the uncertainty on the degree of price stickiness. The latter is modeled by introducing
an uncertain probability of optimally updating the prices in the current period, that
is by assuming that the variables (1  ) and (1  i) in (21) and (23) are stochastic.
With uncertainty on ; ; i; the central bank is uncertain in any period t about the
slope of the aggregate supply in both sectors, dy and 
i
y: The slope of the Phillips curve,
i.e. the response of ination to uctuations in resource utilization, is a relationship
which seems di¢ cult to pin down in a statistically signicant way (Holmberg 2007).
Furthermore, the last two decades point to a attening of the Phillips curve whose causes
are not yet fully understood. Anchoring ination expectations via better monetary policy
seems a prominent candidate to explain this phenomenon (Mishkin 2007, Boivin and
Giannoni 2006, and Roberts 2006), yet changes in the price-setting behaviour could also
be important and dependent on the level and variability of ination8. Bean (2007) also
argues that the attening of the Phillips curve is observationally equivalent to a downward
sloping Phillips curve shifting to the left as the natural rate of unemployment fell with
monetary policy simultaneously ensuring that ination remained stable. This view implies
that the uncertainty about the natural rate of unemployment makes it hard to pin down
the slope of the Phillips curve. All in all, these factors surround the slope of the Phillips
curve with a fair amount of uncertainty.
Also, uncertainty on ;  and i makes uncertain the impact of the terms of trade on
domestic ination, dq ; and the impact of the input price in the import sector on import
ination, iq. These uncertain impacts capture the imperfect knowledge of the central
bank on how the exchange rate a¤ects the economy9. As to the input price in the import
sector, which is a function of the exchange rate, the uncertain coe¢ cient iy determines the
uncertainty on the speed of the pass through. Finally, uncertainty on the completeness
of the pass-through is modelled by assuming that i is a random variable. The existence
of the pass-through uncertainty is commonly known. For example, Cassino, Drew and
McCaw (1999) point out that the pass-through has been quite variable over time in New
Zealand. Pass-through changes can be associated with changes in the use of imported
inputs or in the composition of a countrys import basket if the component products have
distinct pass-through elasticities (Campa and Goldberg 2006 and 2005); with changes in
monetary stability and the persistence of exogenous shocks (Devereux and Engel 2001,
Devereux, Engel and Storgaard 2004, and Devereux and Yetman 2008); with changes
8See, among others, Cogley and Sbordone (2005) and Rubio-Ramirez and Villaverde (2007).
9See Leitemo and Söderström (2007) for the impact on optimal monetary policy of the policymakers
fear of misspesication in the determination of the exchange rate.
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in the market share and in the di¤erentiation degree of goods of the exporting country
(Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2005). Thus, pass-through uncertainty derives from the
limited knowledge on the role played by these and other factors that, both at the micro
and macro level, seem to determine the pass-through.
2.6 Certainty non-equivalence and model uncertainty
To illustrate the introduction of uncertainty on structural parameters in a non-certainty
equivalence environment, it is convenient to rewrite the model in State-space form. From
the central bank standpoint the problem is to nd the expected interest rate path that
minimizes its loss given the law of motion of the economy:
Minfit+ jtg1=0 Et
1X
=0
Y
0
t+KYt+
subject to24 Xt+1
xt+1jt
35 =
24 A11;t+1 A12;t+1
A21;t A22;t
3524 Xt
xt
35+
24 B1;t+1
B2;t
35 it +
24 B11;t+1
B12;t
35 it+1jt +
24 "t+1
0
35 ;
Yt  CZ;t
24 Xt
xt
35+ Ci;tit;
where the target variables, the predetermined variables, and the forward looking variables
are, respectively
Yt =
 
ct ; 
d
t ; y
d
t ; it   it 1
0
;
Xt =

dt ; 
d
t+1jt; 
i
t 1; 

t ; y
d
t ; y
i
t; y

t ; i

t ; y
d;n
t ; y
i;n
t ; it 1; qt 1; q
i
t 1; t
0
;
xt =
 
it; q
i
t; t; 
d
t+2jt
0
;
and whereK captures the central banks preferences, a diagonal matrix with the diagonal 
c; d; ; 

and o¤-diagonal elements equal to zero. Following Svensson and Williams
(2007) I assume that the matrices
A11;t; A12;t; B1;t; B
1
1;t; A21;t; A22;t; B2;t; B
1
2;t; CZ;t; Ci;t; (32)
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are random, each free to take nj di¤erent values in period t corresponding to the nj modes
indexed by jt 2 f1; 2; :::; ng : This means that, for example, A11;t = A11;jt. The modes are
drawn initially from a discrete stationary distribution which is assumed to be uniform. A
uniform distribution captures the assumption that the central bank only knows a band
for each uncertain deep parameter. For each uncertain parameter, say ; a benchmark
value is chosen, ; and the lower and upper bound of the support of the distribution are
set equal to    x and  + x respectively, where the coe¢ cient x modules the variance
of the distribution and therefore the amount of uncertainty.
After the initial draw from the stationary distribution the modes follow a Markov
process with constant transition probabilities given by
Pjk  Pr fjt+1 = kjjt = jg = 1
n
; j; k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng :
Furthermore, I assume that model uncertainty and shocks to the economy are independent
so that modes jt and innovations "t are independently distributed. Finally, I assume that
the central bank does not know how the structural parameters co-move together, should
they be dependent. So in any period the realization of each parameter is independent
of the realizations of the other parameters10. As to the central bank knowledge before
choosing the instrument-plan

it+ jt
	1
=0
at the beginning of period t; the information set
consists of the probability distribution of "t; the transition matrix [Pjk] ; the nj di¤erent
values that each of the matrices can take in any mode, and nally the realizations of
Xt; jt; "t; Xt 1; jt 1; "t 1; xt 1; ::: .
Since the model cannot be solved analytically and embeds also forward looking vari-
ables, I use the numerical methods developed by Svensson and Williams (2007) to nd the
equilibrium in the presence of multiplicative uncertainty under commitment in a time-
less perspective (see Woodford 2003 and Svensson and Woodford 2005)11. Numerical
methods, in turn, require a calibration which is presented in the following section.
2.7 Calibration
Two groups of parameters need to be calibrated to solve the model. The rst consists
of the parameters that are assumed to be known with certainty, while the second the
10If, for example, each uncertain parameter can take d values in any period and there are m uncertain
parameters, then the number of modes is n = dm: In this work d = 5 and m can be either 1 or 2 or 5
depending on the uncertainty cases described below.
11The implementation of these methods, which are used to obtain the gures and tables shown below
is carried out coding in Matlab.
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benchmark values for the uncertain parameters.
The choice of the parameters assumed to be known with certainty follows Svensson
(2000) as the current model is similar in structure to the Svenssons one. These para-
meters, with respect to the domestic economy, are the output elasticity of the marginal
input requirement function, ! = 0:8; the elasticity of substitution between varieties of
the same type of good # = 1:25; the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  = 0:5; the
share of import good in the composite input to produce the domestic good,  = 0:1; the
share of import goods in domestic consumption, w = 0:3. With respect to the foreign
sector, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and import goods for foreign con-
sumers is  = 2; the share of the domestic good in foreign consumption is w = 0:15;
the income elasticity of foreign real consumption is 

y = 0:9; and the coe¢ cients for the
foreign Taylor rule are f = 1:5, and fy = 0:5: Finally, the exogenous cost push and
demand shocks have variances 2 = 
2
y = 1; the natural output shocks have variances
2
yd;n
= 2yi;n = 0:5 and AR(1)-parameter 
d;n
y = 
i;n
y = 0:96; and nally the risk premium,
foreign ination and output have AR(1) process-parameter y =  =  = 0:8 and
variances 2 = 
2
 = 
2
y = 0:5:
The benchmark values of the uncertain parameters follow Banerjee and Batini (2003)
as to the measure of habit formation in the utility function,  = 0:8 and Smets and
Wouters (2005) as to the degree of indexation to the previous period ination rate,  =
0:66. The probability on not optimally updating the price in the current period in the
domestic and import sector, ; and i, are set equal to 0:5 following Svensson (2000)
and Flamini (2007), respectively. Finally, the value of the share of domestic good in the
composite input to supply the import good, i, is set to 0:35 consistently with Flamini
(2007) and such that the lower and upper bound of the support of the i distribution
are realistic for the uncertainty level considered in the analysis; specically the lower and
upper bounds are 0:245 and 0:405:
2.7.1 Robustness check
The current model is also similar in spirit to the Leitemo and Söderström (2005) model.
Although the latter is not microfounded, its parametrization for the exogenous distur-
bances provides a valid alternative to check for the robustness of the results. In the
Leitemo and Söderström model, the cost-push shock and the demand shock are AR(1)
processes and their AR(1)-coe¢ cients,  and y; are set equal to 0.3 (this is a di¤erence
with the previous calibration where the AR(1)-coe¢ cients for these two shocks are im-
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plicitly set equal to zero). The variances for these shocks are 2y = 0:656 and 
2
 = 0:389;
while the variance for the shocks to the risk premium, foreign ination, and foreign output
gap are 2 = 0:844; 
2
 = 0:022; and 
2
y = 0:083; respectively
12. For the risk premium
AR(1)-coe¢ cient , Leitemo and Söderström considers the interval [0; 1] : In the current
analysis, having to choose one value,  is set equal to 0:5:
3 Central bank preferences and distribution forecasts
We can now appreciate how the possibility of moving from mean forecast targeting to
distribution forecast targeting dramatically enriches the monetary policy analysis. In
this work, distribution forecasts are determined by the simultaneous presence of model
uncertainty and exogenous shocks. Their relevance lies in shedding light on two important
aspects of the economic outlook associated with di¤erent monetary policies. The rst is
the expected volatility of the macrovariables at any future time period. The second is
the joint impact of shocks and model uncertainty upon economic stability along with the
specic contribution of model uncertainty.
3.1 Overview with a cost push shock and general uncertainty
Figures 1-2 illustrate the unconditional distribution forecasts of the impulse responses to
a (one standard deviation) cost-push shock in the presence of general uncertainty, which
encompasses uncertainty on the pass-through,
 
ij; 
i
j

; on the persistence in the private
sectors behaviour, (j; j) ; and on the slope of the domestic AS, (j). In each gure,
the rst and second column report the distribution forecasts of the main macrovariables
under the optimal policies of domestic and CPI ination targeting respectively. Assuming
an uncertainty level of 30% on all the uncertain parameters, these gures have been
generated by drawing an initial mode of the Markov chain from its stationary distribution,
simulating the chain for a sequence of periods forward, and then repeating this procedure
for 1000 simulations runs13. Thus these gures display mean (dashed line), and quantiles
(grey bands), of the empirical distribution. In particular, the dark, medium and light grey
band show the 30%, 60%, and 90% probability bands, respectively. Figures 1-2 consider
high and low preferences for interest rate smoothing respectively14. In the former, the
12Leitemo and Roisland (2002) nd these variances with a structural VAR on the Norwegian economy.
13The results presented in this and the next sections are robust to smaller and larger uncertainty levels.
14Specically, the interest rate smoothing preferences parameter, ; in equation (28), is 0:05 in Figure
1 and 0:002 in Figure 2.
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central bank carries out a mild monetary policy in which there is almost no attempt
to bu¤er the shock. This case starts to reveal the impact of model uncertainty and
alternative ination indexes on the distribution forecasts. It thus provides a benchmark.
In the latter case, low preferences for interest rate smoothing, the monetary policy is
more realistic and the di¤erent impact of model uncertainty on the distribution forecasts
linked to alternative preferences on the ination index is fully revealed.
Figure 1 features a high preference for interest rate smoothing. Here visual inspection
shows that the volatility of the macrovariables distribution and the perturbing impact
of the shock tend to be higher under CPI IT. In Figure 2, switching to a low preference
for interest rate smoothing the previous result is strongly amplied: DIT implies much
less volatility of the projections of the economy, in particular of the interest rates, and
a surprisingly better ability to absorb the cost-push shock. As we would have expected,
under CPI IT the optimal monetary policy attempts to absorb the cost-push shock using
the exchange rate. This is reected in the initial decrease of import ination, i; shown
in the sixth row, second column. What is interesting here is that the policy manoeuvre
has a limited impact on absorbing the shock on CPI ination. Indeed, the initial path of
CPI ination is only marginally lower with CPI IT than with DIT. This can be seen in
the last row comparing the distribution forecasts in both cases. Furthermore, in terms of
volatility of the distribution forecast, CPI ination, c, does not seem to be less volatile
under CPI IT. On the basis of these results, it could be argued that shifting from CPI IT
to DIT would imply a small cost in terms of higher CPI ination versus a large benet
in terms of the volatility of the distribution forecast of all the other variables and the ex-
pected perturbing impact of the shock. Nonetheless, di¤erent central banks can attribute
di¤erent values to the distribution forecasts accuracy of various macrovariables and their
expected shock sensitivity. An extreme case could be, for example, a central bank that is
only concerned in keeping CPI ination as close as possible to its long run value. For this
central bank, CPI IT would be the most appropriate policy. Thus, the usefulness of these
ndings primarily lies in showing what the domestic and CPI ination targeting policies
can o¤er in terms of distribution forecasts accuracy and expected economic stability.
It is also worth noting that switching from high to low interest rate smoothing, the
overall volatility of the economy does not increase much with DIT while it gets huge with
CPI IT. Thus, the domestic ination index stands out also for much less sensitiveness to
abrupt changes of the interest rate.
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3.2 Preferences and volatility of the i and yd distribution fore-
casts with a cost-push shock in various uncertainty cases
On the basis of the previous analysis with high and low interest smoothing preferences, a
natural question to ask is whether the volatility of the macrovariables is monotonous in
the preferences for smoothing. This is relevant given the uncertainty on the smoothing
preferences of the central bank and, more in general, the time varying degree of activism
in monetary policy possibly related to central bank judgment. To address this question,
Figure 3 focuses on the cost-push shock case and presents the standard deviation of
the distribution forecasts of the nominal interest rate and the domestic output-gap for
the periods considered above and for interest rate smoothing values in the set V =
f0:002; 0:005; :::; 0:04g15. Explaining this gure, each sub plot reports two surfaces that
describe the standard deviation of the distribution forecasts under CPI and DIT. The rst
and the second row refer to the interest rate and the output gap, respectively, while the
columns refer to four uncertainty cases, specically uncertainty (i) on the pass-through,
(ii) on the persistence of the behaviour of households and rms, (iii) on the degree of
price exibility in the domestic sector (AS slope uncertainty), and (iv) on all the previous
sources, i.e. general uncertainty.
A rst result considering the interest rate (rst row) is that either the CPI IT surface is
always above the DIT surface (in the uncertainty on the pass-through, on the persistence
in the behaviour of households and rms, and general uncertainty cases, rst, second,
and forth column respectively), or the two surfaces tend to overlap with the DIT one
slightly above the CPI one for small preferences on interest rate smoothing (in the cases
of uncertainty on the slope of the Phillips curve in the domestic sector, third column).
This shows that under the pass-through, persistence, and general uncertainty cases the
CPI IT policy results systematically in a larger standard deviation for the distribution
forecast of the interest rate than DIT. Instead, when we consider the case of uncertainty
on the degree of price exibility in the domestic sector, the standard deviation associated
with DIT tends to be higher than the one associated with CPI IT. Moving to the second
row describing the variability of the distribution forecast of the output gap in the domestic
sector we obtain similar results.
Second, the volatility of the distribution forecasts of the interest rate and the output
gap tend to be monotonically increasing in the preference for not smoothing the interest
rate. Yet, it is interesting to note that, decreasing interest rate smoothing, the volatility
15Section 3.4. and 3.5 will extend the analysis to other macrovariables and shocks.
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under CPI IT tends to increase more than under DIT.
The relevance of these ndings lies in unveiling DIT as a policy that leads to less
variability of the distribution forecasts of the interest rate and of the output gap in the
presence of a cost-push shock. Also, it is less sensitive to interest rate smoothing than
the CPI IT policy. Since the interest rate smoothing preference is inversely linked to the
preferences for the other target variables16, it follows that with DIT the central bank can
stabilize the output gap and ination with a lower cost in terms of a rough path of the
interest rate.
In order to quantitatively compare the policies associated with the two surfaces it is
informative to compute the ratio of the means (along all the smoothing preferences values
and the periods considered) of the standard deviations in the two policy cases, i.e.
R  mean

;tstd
c
;t (variable)
mean

;tstdd;t (variable)
;
where stdh;t (variable) ; h = c; d; denote the standard deviation of the distribution forecast
of the considered variable for period t, and smoothing preferences value ; and c and d
denote CPI and DIT, respectively. Table 2 considers the nominal interest rate and the
domestic output gap and presents the statistics R for various uncertainty types.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
This analysis shows that for the nominal interest rate, in almost all uncertainty cases,
domestic ination preferences dominate CPI ination preferences. Furthermore, when
we focus on the more representative case of general uncertainty, which includes all the
previous cases, the mean of the standard deviation under CPI IT is 2.79 times larger than
under DIT. Considering the output gap, DIT dominates CPI IT in all the uncertainty
cases except the one of uncertainty on the slope of the aggregate supply where they tend
to be equivalent. In the general uncertainty case the average variability of the distribution
forecast for the output gap with the CPI policy is 1.48 times larger than with the other
policy.
16To see this, just scale the weighs in the loss function.
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3.3 Preferences and expected stability of i and yd with a cost
push shock in various uncertainty cases
An interesting question to ask is how central banks preferences rank in terms of the
expected perturbing impact of exogenous shocks on the economy. The medians of the
distribution forecasts provide a prima facie answer. Figure 4 illustrates the medians
of the distribution forecasts of the nominal interest rate and the domestic output gap,
rst and second row respectively. The columns refer to the uncertainty cases. These
medians (for the considered periods and values of interest rate smoothing preferences)
are illustrated by two surfaces for the CPI and DIT policies. Denoting these surfaces
as median surfaces, the distance of the median surface from the zero plane provides a
measure of the expected median perturbing impact of the shock. Interestingly, Figure 4
shows that the distance of the median surface from the zero plane under CPI IT is always
larger than under DIT.
Recalling that the model variables are log deviations from their steady state values,
this result shows that with DIT the nominal interest rate and the output gap are expected
to deviate less from the long-run equilibrium after a cost push shock than with CPI IT.
In order to quantitatively compare the distance of the two surfaces from the zero
plane it is informative to introduce the ratio of the means (of the absolute values) of the
medians in the two policy cases for all the smoothing preferences values and the period
considered, that is
RM 
X
2V
TX
t=0
medianc;t (variable)mediand;t (variable) ;
Table 3 reports RM with respect to the nominal interest rate and the output gap.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
It shows that if the central bank chooses the CPI IT policy, the expected median
deviation from the steady state value for the nominal interest rate and the output gap in
the general uncertainty case are, respectively, 2.26 and 2.06 times larger than if it chooses
the DIT policy.
3.4 A broad perspective with general uncertainty
To complete the picture of the relation between the choice of the ination index, distrib-
ution forecasts accuracy and expected economic stability, I extend the analysis to other
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macrovariables and shocks. The other macrovariables considered are CPI and domestic
ination, c and d respectively, the short term real interest rate, r; and the real exchange
rate, q: The other (one standard deviation) shocks considered are a shock to the aggregate
demand, the foreign interest rate, the natural output, the risk premium, and the foreign
output. The results are reported in Tables 4-5 for the general uncertainty case.
INSERT TABLES 4-5 HERE
To discuss the results it is useful to dene three levels of dominance in terms of
intervals for the ratios R and RM . These levels of dominance are
Weak Dominance () 0:9 < R  1:1
Dominance () 0:5 < R  0:9 or 1:1 < R  2
Strong Dominance () 0 < R  0:5 or R > 2
Results in Tables 4a show that, with regard to less volatility, DIT is strongly dominant
in 8 cases, dominant in 8 cases, weakly dominant in 4 cases, weakly dominated in 6 cases,
dominated in 10 cases, and strongly dominated in 0 cases. Thus, abstracting from the
weak dominance cases, DIT is strongly dominant or dominant in 44.4% of the cases, while
it is dominated in 27.7% of the cases. Considering expected shock sensitivity, Table 5a
shows similar results: DIT is strongly dominant or dominant in 47.2% of the cases, while
it is dominated in 22.2% of the cases17. Interestingly, DIT strongly dominates in terms of
volatility and expected shock sensitivity in approximately one fth and one third of the
cases respectively, yet it is never strongly dominated. Checking for the robustness of these
results, the analysis based on the Leitemo and Söderström (2005) calibration corroborates
the previous ndings. Results on Table 4b show that in terms of less volatility, DIT is
strongly dominant or dominant in the 63.8% while it is dominated in the 16.6% of the
cases. In terms of shock sensitivity, DIT is strongly dominant or dominant in 61.1% of
the cases and is dominated in 11.1% of the cases.
It is worth noting that the cases in which DIT is dominated tend to pertain to CPI
ination, as we would expect, and also to the real exchange rate. As to the former, except
for the cost-push shock, both the distribution forecasts of domestic and CPI ination are
not very sensitive to exogenous disturbances. Thus the two policies tend to be similar in
their ability to stabilize ination even if each one is better at stabilizing its own measure
of ination18. As to the latter, the real exchange rate, with a demand, natural output,
17DIT is strongly dominant in 12 cases, dominant in 5 cases, weakly dominant in 3 cases, weakly
dominated in 8 cases, dominated in 8 cases, and strongly dominated in 0 cases.
18The impulse response distribution forecasts for the complete set of shocks are available upon request.
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risk premium, and foreign output shock, CPI IT performs better as is shown in Table
4a,b. This is due to the fact that it aims to stabilize both domestic and import ination,
which determine the real exchange rate.
Shocks to the risk premium, foreign interest rate and foreign output gap deserve a
nal comment. In these cases the shocks impact on the nominal exchange rate via the
uncovered interest parity. Then, if the central bank does not react, the shock propagates
to CPI ination. Thus with CPI IT the central bank has to respond to these shocks. Yet,
the central bank may not be willing to react to shocks that a¤ect the nominal exchange
rate. Leitemo and Söderström (2005) maintain that it should not. Their argument is that
there is uncertainty about how the exchange rate is determined and the e¤ect of exchange
rate movements on the economy. This implies that rules with the exchange rate are more
sensitive to model uncertainty. Thus a monetary policy developed in the context of an
exchange rate model could perform poorly if that model is incorrect. Empirical evidence
in this respect is not conclusive. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) nd that Australia and
New Zealand did not react to movements in the exchange rate while Canada and the UK
did.
These results on overall forecastsaccuracy and economic instability are based on two
factors. More policy activism under CPI IT than under DIT and the presence of model
uncertainty.
More policy activism under CPI IT is determined by two di¤erences between CPI
ination and domestic ination. First, monetary policy can a¤ect CPI ination before
domestic ination via import ination. This is due to the fact that the domestic sector
produces and retails domestic goods, while the import sector only retails foreign goods.
The presence of production decisions matters in that it implies a longer lag for monetary
policy to a¤ect domestic ination than CPI ination via the output gap. This is the policy
transmission that occurs through the aggregate demand channel and/or the switching
demand exchange rate channel. Similarly, the exchange rate and the price of the foreign
goods in foreign currency a¤ect domestic ination with a lag via qt in the AS for the
domestic sector, while they a¤ect directly import ination via qit in the AS for the import
sector19.
The second di¤erence between CPI and domestic ination is that the former is more
exposed to foreign shocks. Shocks to the risk premium, the foreign interest rate, or
foreign output and ination lead to exchange rate volatility via the uncovered interest
19The impact of the exchange rate on the domestic price of the foreign good is amply documented in
the literature and usually referred to as the Direct Exchange Rate channel.
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parity. Since import sector inputs are more intensive in foreign goods than domestic
sector inputs, movements in the exchange rate exert a stronger impact on CPI ination
than domestic ination. Thus, to avoid that exchange rate volatility lead to CPI ination
volatility, the central bank has to intervene promptly. This means that under CPI IT, in
the presence of foreign shocks there is a more pronounced trade-o¤ between CPI ination
and interest rate volatility.
These di¤erences among the ination indices imply that CPI ination is more sensi-
tive to monetary policy and external shocks than domestic ination. As a result, they
tend to foster more policy activism under CPI IT as shown by Tables 6a,b that extend
Tables 5a,b to the case of no model uncertainty20. Focusing on the nominal interest rate
(fourth column), Tables 6a,b show that DIT tends to dominate CPI IT. When model
uncertainty is introduced, more activism under CPI IT implies that this policy leads to
more overall volatility in the distribution forecasts and more economic instability than
DIT. The specic impact of model uncertainty on economic instability is presented and
discussed in the next section by contrasting Tables 5a,b with 6a,b.
3.5 Model uncertainty and expected economic instability
Tables 5a,b describe the ability of domestic and CPI ination targeting to stabilize the
economy in the presence of exogenous shocks (additive uncertainty) and model uncer-
tainty (multiplicative uncertainty). While considering simultaneously these sources of
uncertainty matters to investigate optimal monetary policy in a more realistic frame-
work, it is interesting to assess the specic contribution of model uncertainty. In fact,
most of the literature on monetary policy abstracts from model uncertainty, even though
its existence poses a major challenge to real-world monetary policy. It is therefore rele-
vant to analyze the extent to which accounting for model uncertainty a¤ects the results
on economic instability.
Tables 6a abstracts frommodel uncertainty and shows that domestic and CPI ination
20With no multiplicative uncertainty, at any point in time a distribution forecast boils down to de-
generate distribution forecast, which is the probability distribution of a random variable with always the
same value. Characterized by a support of only one value, say k0, the degenerate distribution is localized
at a point k0 on the real line and its probability mass function is given by
f (k; k0) =

1; if k = k0
0; if k 6= k0:
Thus, a degenerate distribution does satisfy the denition of random variable and k0 is both the mean
and the median of the distribution.
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targeting are dominant or strongly dominant in 41.6% and 13.8% of the cases respectively,
whereas weak dominance occurs in the remaining 44.4% of the cases. Moving with Table
5a from additive uncertainty only to both additive and multiplicative uncertainty dra-
matically increases the di¤erences in the policiesperformance. We observe that the weak
dominance cases fall to 30.5% and that the cases in which domestic and CPI ination
targeting are dominant or strongly dominant rise to 47.2% and 22.2%, respectively.
These results are again corroborated by the analysis based on the Leitemo and Söder-
ström (2005) calibration. Table 6b shows that domestic and CPI ination targeting are
strongly dominant or dominant in the 46.6% and 10% of the cases, while weak domi-
nance occurs in the remaining 43.3% of the cases. Taking into account model uncertainty
with Table 5b, the weak dominance cases fall to 33.3% and the strong dominance and
dominance cases rise to 56.6% with DIT but remain at the 10% with CPI IT.
Three remarks are in order. First these results show that without model uncertainty
DIT already leads to more overall economic stability than CPI IT. This result is deter-
mined by the larger policy activism that occurs with CIP IT. Interestingly, the mechanism
that generates more economic stability under DIT is consistent with the mechanism that
governs economic stability in Mankiew and Reis (2003). Indeed, Mankiew and Reis show
that a price index for economic stability should weigh more the sectors whose price level is
more predetermined and are less exposed to idiosyncratic shocks. As discussed before, in
the current model the presence of import ination in CPI ination implies that domestic
ination is more predetermined and less exposed to foreign shocks than CPI ination.
As a result, less policy activism occurs that, in turn, leads to more economic stability.
Second, these results show that considering the presence of multiplicative uncertainty
does matter in assessing the performance of di¤erent policies in terms of expected eco-
nomic stability. Multiplicative uncertainty sharpens the di¤erence in the performance of
the two policies by reducing the number of weak dominance cases. Hence, considering
multiplicative uncertainty allows the policy makers taking more informed decisions on
the convenience of the two policies in a larger number of cases. Finally, these ndings
reveal that multiplicative uncertainty magnies the tendency of DIT to dominate CPI IT
in terms of economic stability for several macrovariables.
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4 Forecast accuracy and future policy inclinations
On the basis of the previous ndings, an ination targeting central bank that chooses
domestic instead of CPI ination stabilization improves the quality of several forecasts,
in particular for the interest rate. Interestingly, this result relates to transparency in
monetary policy and bears a signicant policy implication. In particular, it relates to
transparency on future policy intentions and to the recent debate on the instrument-
rate assumption underlying projections of target variables. The debate arises from two
alternatives facing monetary policy which imply di¤erent levels of transparency: either
publishing the optimal instrument-rate plan and the corresponding projections of the
economy, or publishing the projections of the economy based on a specic assumption on
the interest rate, e.g. the assumption of a constant interest rate or an interest rate path
given by market expectations21. The rst alternative has been pioneered by the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand and then adopted by the Norges Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, and
the Czech National Bank. Yet, most of the ination targeting central banks has so far
opted for the second alternative being reluctant or very cautious in fully disclosing future
policy intentions.
In this respect it can be argued that the more accurate and reliable the central bank
distribution forecasts, the more the central bank can a¤ect the private sector expectations
if it chooses to be transparent and disclose future policy intentions. Hence, by showing
the existence of a relationship between alternative ination indexes and the quality of
the distribution forecasts, this paper suggests that the choice of DIT can increase the
benets associated with transparency on future policy inclinations.
5 Conclusions
This paper argues that the choice of the ination index to target signicantly a¤ects
forecastsaccuracy and economic stability. In particular this work rst shows that when
model uncertainty is considered in the policy design, choosing the domestic ination
index reduces the volatility of the distribution forecasts for most of the macrovariables.
On the other hand, if the central bank has a special interest in reducing the volatility
of CPI ination, and in some cases of the real exchange rate, regardless of the other
macrovariables, then choosing the CPI suits this goal better.
21For a discussion on these alternatives, see Blinder and Wyplosz (2004), Goodhart (2005), Honkapo-
hja and Mitra (2005), Mishkin (2004), Moessner and Nelson (2008), Qvigstad (2006), Rudebusch and
Williams (2007), Svensson (2006, 2008), Woodford (2005) and Holmsen et. al (2008).
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Second, DIT tends to dominate CPI IT in terms of expected economic stability. Fur-
thermore, accounting for model uncertainty magnies this tendency and markedly im-
proves the policymakersability to take informed decisions on the convenience of each
index.
Finally, the paper shows that preferences on smoothing the interest rate do not a¤ect
much the behavior of the economy under DIT, while they do a¤ect it under CPI IT.
Arguably, central banks may not have any preferences on smoothing the interest rate
(see Rudebusch 2002, 2006). Yet, if they do, the relevance of this result lies in allowing
the central bank to stabilize the output gap and ination with lower costs in terms of a
rough path of the interest rate.
These ndings also present an additional reason in favor of publishing the central
bank optimal instrument-rate plan and the corresponding projections of the economy.
In fact, by targeting domestic ination instead of CPI ination it is possible to obtain
more accurate forecasts of the economys dynamics, in particular of the interest rate.
If the accurateness of the forecasts increases the potential accountability of the central
bank and its credibility, it can also improve the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy via the
management of the private sectors expectations. The policy implication is that the choice
of DIT can increase the benets associated with transparency on future policy intentions.
Thus, under DIT, these results support the alternative to publish the projections of the
economy corresponding to the optimal interest rate path expected by the central bank.
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Table 1. Benchmark values for the uncertain parameters
Uncertainty type i yd
Pass-through 3.68 2.27
Persistence private sector behavior 1.16 1.11
Domestic AS slope 0.91 1.01
General 2.79 1.48
Table 2. R : Ratio of the means under DIT and CPI IT of the standard deviations of
the distribution forecasts for interest rate smoothing preferences  2 f0:002; 0:005; :::; 0:04g
and periods t 2 f0; 1; ::; 15g : Shock: cost-push. First calibration.
Uncertainty type i yd
Pass-through 1.74 1.63
Persistence private sector behavior 1.82 1.47
Domestic AS slope 2.01 1.64
General 2.26 2.06
Table 3. RM : Ratio of the means under DIT and CPI IT of the standard deviations of
the distribution forecasts for interest rate smoothing preferences  2 f0:002; 0:005; :::; 0:04g
and periods t 2 f0; 1; ::; 15g : Shock: cost-push. First calibration.
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 Cost-push 0.96 1.01 1.42 1.64 0.94 1.17 
 Demand 1.02 1.05 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.09 
 Foreign interest rate 0.82 4.26 2.70 6.72 8.49 0.97 
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Figure 1: Unconditional distribution forecasts of the impulse responses to a cost-push shock in the general 
uncertainty case and for high smoothing preferences, i.e. 05.0 . First and second column report, 
respectively, the distribution forecasts under the DIT and CPI IT policies. Solid lines: Mean responses. 
Dark/medium/light grey bands: 30/60/90% probability bands. First calibration. 
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Figure 2: Unconditional distribution forecasts of the impulse responses to a cost-push shock in the general 
uncertainty case and for low smoothing preferences, i.e. 002.0 . First and second column report, 
respectively, the distribution forecasts under the DIT and CPI IT policies. Solid lines: Mean responses. 
Dark/medium/light grey bands: 30/60/90% probability bands. First calibration. 
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Figure 3. STD of the impulse response distribution to a cost-push shock under DIT and CPI IT for 
  04.0...,,005.0,002.0 and  15...,,1,0 t . Variables: i and  dy , first and second row 
respectively. Uncertainty cases: pass-through, persistence in the behaviour of the private sector, slope 
of the domestic AS, and general, first, second, third and forth column respectively. First calibration. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Median of the impulse response distribution to a cost-push shock under DIT and CPI IT 
for   04.0...,,005.0,002.0 and  15...,,1,0 t . Variables: i and  dy , first and second row 
respectively. Uncertainty cases: pass-through, persistence in the behaviour of the private sector, slope 
of the domestic AS, and general, first, second, third and forth column, respectively. First calibration. 
Central Bank Preferences, Distribution Forecasts and
Economic Stability in a Small Open-Economy
Appendix: State-space form
In order to apply the Svensson and Williams (2007) approach to solve the central bank
optimization problem and compute the distribution forecasts, it is necessary to write the
model in state-space form. Accordingly, rst note that
dt+2jt+1 = 
d
t+2jt +
j
1 + j
"t+1;
t+1jt = t   it + dt+1jt; (33)
qt+1jt = qt + it+1jt   dt+1jt: (34)
Then, take the expectation in period t of equation (21) and solve it for dt+3jt;
dt+3jt = (1 + j)
d
t+2jt   jdt+1jt   j

!ydt+2jt + qt+2jt

: (35)
where j  (1 j)
2
j(1+!#)
: Next, lead equation (16) one period and take the expectation in
period t: Then apply the same procedure to (33), (34) and (23) and substitute for t+2jt,
qt+2jt and it+2jt in the equation for y
d
t+2jt. This gives
ydt+2jt = yjy
d
t+1jt   t+1jt + it+1jt   ( + q)dt+2jt + (q   q 1;j) qt
+ [q (2 + j)  q 1;j] it+1jt   (q   q 1;j)dt+1jt   qjit   qij!yit+1jt
  qijqit+1jt + yjyt+1jt + ynjyd;nt+1jt;
where ij  (
1 ij)
2
ij(1+!#)
: Finally, substitute for ydt+2jt and qt+2jt in (35). This gives
dt+3jt = [1 + j + j! ( + q) + j] 
d
t+2jt + [j  j + j! (q   q 1;j)]dt+1jt
+
 
j!q
i
j + j
i
j

qit+1jt   j [! (q (2 + j)  q 1;j) +  (1 + j) + ] it+1jt
  j!yydt+1jt + j!t+1jt   j!it+1jt + jj (!q + )it
+ !j
i
j (!q + ) y
i
t+1jt   !jyjyt+1jt   !jynjyd;nt+1jt   j [! (q   q 1;j) + ] qt:
It follows that under the Svensson (2003) calibration we have
1
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;
where ei; i = 0; :::; n stands for a 1xn row vector that for i = 0 has all the elements equal
to zero and for i 6= 0 has element i equal to unity and all other elements equal to zero;
Ai stands for row i of the matrix A; nX = 14 is the number of predetermined variables,
nx = 4 is the number of non-predetermined variables, n = nX + nx, and
An = [1 + j + j! ( + q) + j] en + [j  j + j! (q   q 1;j)]A1
+
 
j!q
i
j + j
i
t

AnX+2   j [! (q (2 + j)  q 1;j) +  (1 + j) + ]AnX+1
  j!yA5 + j!AnX+3 + jj (!q + ) enX+1
+ !j
i
j (!q + )A6   !jyjA7   !jynjA9   j [! (q   q 1;j) + ]A12:
Finally the vectors B and B1 are given by
B = e05 + e
0
6
i
 + e
0
11 + enX+2
 
1  ij
  e0nX+3
+ e0n
 j! (1 + yj) + jij (!q + )  1  ij+ jij! (q! + ) i
B1 =  e0nj!:
2
Under the Leitemo and Söderström (2005) calibration nX = 16; the vector of prede-
termined variable is
Xt =

dt ; 
d
t+1jt; 
i
t 1; 

t ; y
d
t ; y
i
t; y

t ; i

t ; y
d;n
t ; y
i;n
t ; it 1; qt 1; q
i
t 1; "t; ; t; t
0
;
and
A1 = e2 + AnX 2
A5 = yje5  AnX+3+ q (A12 + AnX+1   A1)  q 1;jA12+ yje7+ ynje9+AnX 1
A6 = yje6 iAnX+3+iq (A12 + AnX+1   A1)+iq 1;jA12+iyje7+iynje10+AnX 1
AnX 2 = enX 2
AnX 1 = yenX 1
At this point the Svensson and Williams (2007) numerical methods to nd the distri-
bution forecasts are implemented in Matlab.
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